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Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is
conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that
it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here,
we derive predictions from both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on context-specific sex
differences in cooperation, and we conduct a unique meta-analytic study of 272 effect sizes—sampled
across 50 years of research—on social dilemmas to examine several potential moderators. The overall
average effect size is not statistically different from zero (d  –0.05), suggesting that men and women
do not differ in their overall amounts of cooperation. However, the association between sex and
cooperation is moderated by several key features of the social context: Male–male interactions are more
cooperative than female–female interactions (d  0.16), yet women cooperate more than men in
mixed-sex interactions (d  –0.22). In repeated interactions, men are more cooperative than women.
Women were more cooperative than men in larger groups and in more recent studies, but these
differences disappeared after statistically controlling for several study characteristics. We discuss these
results in the context of both sociocultural and evolutionary theories of sex differences, stress the need
for an integrated biosocial approach, and outline directions for future research.
Keywords: gender, sex differences, cooperation, social dilemmas, meta-analysis
Are women or men more cooperative? There is some evidence
that women, relative to men, are kinder (Conway, Pizzamiglio, &
Mount, 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984), more agreeable (Feingold,
1994), more supportive of their friends (Oswald, Clark, & Kelly,
2004), and more cooperative in same-sex work groups (Chatman
& O’Reilly, 2004). In contrast, men provide more help to strangers
in need (Eagly & Crowley, 1986), have a stronger preference for
coordinated social play as children (Benenson, Apostoleris, &
Parnass, 1997), and tend to cooperate more in larger groups
(Gabriel & Gardner, 1999).
In a seminal review of sex differences, Maccoby and Jacklin
(1974) examined the degree to which men and women differ in
a variety of social behaviors. Although they found some evi-
dence for sex differences, in most behavioral domains—
including cooperation—research findings were rather inconclu-
sive. Recent behavioral economics research comparing men’s
and women’s decisions in bargaining games (Eckel & Gross-
man, 2001; Solnick, 2001) and dictator games (Andreoni &
Vesterlund, 2001; Bolton & Katok, 1995; Dufwenberg &
Muren, 2006) also finds no systematic sex differences. Taken
together, several decades of research suggest that overall
women and men are equally cooperative.
Recent theorizing on sex differences suggests that rather than
looking for main effects, it may be more productive to investigate
the environment in which men and women make cooperative
decisions (Hyde, 2005; Simpson & Van Vugt, 2009; Weber, Ko-
pelman, & Messick, 2004). Depending on contextual factors,
sometimes women may be more cooperative, and other times men.
To investigate context-dependent sex differences in cooperation,
we use a meta-analytic approach to analyze research on experi-
mental social dilemmas, a decision environment that is highly
controlled and allows us to test some potentially important mod-
erators.
Although cooperation can be studied with a variety of methods,
including ethnographies (e.g., Mauss, 1950/1990; Mead, 1961;
Sahlins, 1972) and surveys (e.g., Major & Adams, 1983; Swap &
Rubin, 1983), the social dilemma literature uses a standard exper-
imental paradigm to investigate when and how individuals coop-
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erate (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). In social dilemmas, cooperative
motives are pitted directly against selfish motives, and individuals
must choose between these two motivations (Dawes, 1980).1 In
addition to offering an unambiguous and carefully controlled de-
cision situation to study cooperation, two strengths of the social
dilemma literature are its vastness—it spans over 50 years of
research—and the fact that many important contextual variables,
including the size and sex composition of the group, have been
investigated. As we outline below, these contextual variables may
be crucial in determining whether women or men are more coop-
erative.
The present research examines 50 years of empirical research on
social dilemmas with three primary goals in mind. First, we
provide a conclusive meta-analytic test to examine whether
women or men are more cooperative. Second, we draw insights
about potential sex differences in cooperation by utilizing two
dominant frameworks on sex differences in social behavior: the
evolutionary and the sociocultural perspective. Third, we examine
several potential moderators of sex differences in cooperation
(e.g., sex of the partner, one-shot vs. iterated interactions, group
size, and year of publication).
Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas are situations in which two or more individuals
interact with each other. Each person must decide between a
behavioral option that results in a good outcome for themselves
versus one that results in a good collective outcome (Dawes, 1980;
Kollock, 1998; Komorita & Parks, 1994). If each individual
chooses selfishly, then everyone in the group ends up with a worse
outcome than if each individual acts in the interest of the group.
The most commonly studied social dilemma is the prisoner’s
dilemma. In its most simplified version, this dilemma involves two
individuals and presents each person with two options (cooperate
or defect). If both individuals cooperate (the C-choice), each
person receives a modest monetary reward (say $10). However, if
only one person cooperates, then the defecting partner (the
D-choice) receives a large payoff (say $40), and the cooperator
receives the lowest payoff ($0)—the so-called “sucker” payoff. If
both individuals pursue their dominant strategy (to defect), then
each receives a lower payoff (say $2) than if both cooperated
($10). It is a social dilemma because each individual gains more by
defecting regardless of what the other person does, but they will
both be better off if they both cooperate rather than defect.
Social dilemmas can involve two persons or more. Extensions of
the prisoner’s dilemma to larger groups include N-person prisoners
dilemmas, public goods dilemmas (give-some games), and re-
source dilemmas (take-some games). In public goods dilemmas,
the players can decide to cooperate with each other to provide the
public good (e.g., public radio), but there is a temptation for each
to not contribute. In resource dilemmas, the players can cooperate
with each other to maintain a common resource (e.g., common
fisheries), but there is a selfish temptation for each individual to
consume as much as possible. There is much research both on
public goods (Ledyard, 1995) and resource dilemmas (Kopelman,
Weber, & Messick, 2002) that has reported the effect of sex on
cooperation, which we include in our meta-analysis.
The social dilemma paradigm has both a high internal and
external validity, which makes it very suitable for testing potential
sex differences that can be generalized across a wide range of
cooperative situations, from helping complete strangers to coop-
erating in romantic relationships and from dyadic social dilemmas
to group dilemmas. Furthermore, the social dilemma paradigm
measures actual behavior rather than hypothetical decisions or
behavioral intentions. Finally, the social dilemma literature is
vast—spanning over 50 years—and one of the most commonly
reported variables in research on social dilemmas is the partici-
pant’s sex, which makes it ideally suited for a thorough meta-
analytic review.
Sex Differences in Cooperation
In one of the earliest research on sex differences in cooperation,
Rapoport and Chammah (1965) compared male–male, female–
female, and mixed-sex dyads behavior in an iterated (repeated)
prisoner’s dilemma lasting 300 trials. They found that, on average,
the male–male pairings exhibited greater cooperation than the
mixed-sex pairings, with the female–female pairings being least
cooperative. Although this study failed to provide a convincing
explanation for these results, it nevertheless sparked a great deal of
interest in sex differences in cooperation in the late 1960s and
early 1970s (e.g., Bedell & Sistrunk, 1973; Grant & Sermant,
1969). However, there was not a clear picture emerging from these
studies (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).
Without a clear theory to work from, social psychologists’ interest
in sex differences in cooperation waned by the 1990s. Nowadays, it is
primarily behavioral economists who study sex differences in social
dilemmas (e.g., Brown-Kruse & Hummels, 1993; Cadsby & Maynes,
1998; Mason, Phillips, & Redington, 1991; Ortmann & Tichy, 1999).
For instance, Croson and Gneezy (2009) recently provided a narrative
review of the economics literature and concluded that the results on
sex differences are inconclusive. Without doing a systematic meta-
analysis, they observed a greater variation in women’s cooperation
across studies, suggesting that women are relatively more sensitive to
the experimental context. However, they did not specify in which
situations women and men respond differentially to social dilemmas.
Thus, there is still no comprehensive picture of when sex differences
in cooperation are likely to emerge in social dilemmas and, if so, why
they are there.
1 More specifically, social dilemmas involve a conflict between altruistic
and cooperative (maximizing joint gain or equality) motives against indi-
vidualistic, competitive, and aggressive motives (Van Lange, 1999). One
prior meta-analysis examined sex differences in competition using social
dilemmas (Walters et al., 1998). However, we believe that social dilemmas
do not provide a strong test of sex differences in competitive motives
because of at least two reasons. First, most individuals are driven by either
cooperative or selfish motives during social dilemmas, with very few
individuals adopting a competitive motivational orientation (Au & Kwong,
2004). Second, even when people are placed in matrix games that isolate
competitive motives from self-interest, most everyone chooses to cooper-
ate, presumably because cooperation is now aligned with self-interest
(McClintock & McNeel, 1966). In fact, for the reasons outlined above,
researchers label behavior either cooperative or non-cooperative in social
dilemmas to avoid implying that non-cooperation was the result of being
competitive (De Dreu, 2010; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). Therefore, in keep-
ing with the literature on social dilemmas, we focus on sex differences in
cooperation and not competition.
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A notable exception is Simpson and Van Vugt’s (2009) recent
theory arguing that men and women respond to different aspects of
the social dilemma. Using an evolutionary approach, they argued that
men defect primarily because they are motivated by personal greed,
whereas women defect primarily because they are motivated by the
fear of other’s defection. Because prisoner’s dilemmas, public goods
dilemmas, and resource dilemmas involve both fear and greed com-
ponents, there are no overall sex differences in cooperation showing
up, but by manipulating fear and greed separately one can expect to
find them (e.g., Simpson, 2003). Our research builds upon this idea by
focusing on whether women and men respond differently to the social
features of the social dilemma.
Theoretical Perspectives on Sex Differences in
Cooperation
There have been various theoretical advances in social psychol-
ogy in recent decades contributing to the scientific understanding
of sex differences in social behavior (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998;
Eckes & Trautner, 2000). Recent theoretical progress on under-
standing sex differences has been made primarily through both
sociocultural and evolutionary psychology theories. Each of these
major perspectives has guided research on sex differences in many
areas, including helping behavior (Eagly, 2009; Eagly & Crowley,
1986), aggression (Archer, 2004, 2009; Eagly & Steffen, 1986),
leadership styles (Eagly & Johnson, 1990), mate preferences (Ken-
rick & Keefe, 1992), and sexual strategies (Buss & Schmidt,
1993). Yet, surprisingly little research on sex differences in coop-
eration has been guided by either of these theoretical perspectives
(for exceptions, see Geary, Byrd-Craven, Haord, Vigil, & Numtee,
2003; Sell & Kuipers, 2009; Simpson & Van Vugt, 2009), and, to
our knowledge, no research has systematically compared these
perspectives. As we describe below, each perspective provides
unique insights into the origins and manifestation of sex differ-
ences in social dilemmas.
The Sociocultural Perspective
The sociocultural theory of sex differences considers different
social experiences between men and women as the origin of sex
differences in social behavior (Cross & Madson, 1997; Eagly &
Wood, 1999; Wood & Eagly, 2010). According to this perspective,
social structural aspects of society—a different distribution of men
and women in specific social roles and a gender hierarchy—are the
main contributors to sex typical social behaviors (Eagly & Wood,
1999). For instance, because men are, on average, physically
stronger and faster and because women bear the costs of pregnancy
and childcare, men and women have historically taken on different
social roles. Because of these biological differences, men and
women acquire culturally different sets of skills to fulfill the duties
of their social roles, and this affects the expectations associated
with their gender. Women are expected to assume a domestic role
(or occupational role) that involves a great deal of interpersonal
relationship skills. Accordingly, women are—or at least are per-
ceived as—more communal in orientation, less selfish, more car-
ing, friendly, and emotionally expressive (Eagly, 2009). On the
other hand, men assume social roles of high status and power and
so they are—or are perceived as—more independent, assertive,
ambitious, and dominant. As a result of different socialization
experiences, women thus develop more interpersonal skills, and
men develop more agentic skills. Moreover, women and men may
include their gender stereotype into their self-concept and self-
regulate their behavior according to these standards (Witt & Wood,
2010). Indeed, previous research has found that stereotypes of men
and women as agentic and communal, respectively, underlie many
sex differences in social behavior, especially in contexts when
these stereotypes are salient (Eagly & Wood, 2011).
What are the implications of sociocultural theory for understanding
gender differences in social dilemmas? Cooperation in a social di-
lemma, by definition, conveys a concern for the welfare of others,
which is what a communal orientation is all about (e.g., Conway et al.,
1996; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). In contrast, an
agentic orientation involves a concern for own outcomes over others
outcomes (A. Campbell, Muncer, & Gorman, 1993; Pruitt, 1983),
which should lead to greater defection in social dilemmas. Indeed,
there is evidence that people with a communal orientation (Balliet,
Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Probst, Carnevale, & Triandis, 1999) or
who display communally oriented behaviors cooperate more in social
dilemmas (Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; Rusbult, Verette, Whit-
ney, Slovic, & Lipkus, 1991; Van Lange et al., 1997; Van Vugt & De
Cremer, 1999). Women are expected to be more cooperative than men
in social dilemmas (e.g., Orbell, Dawes, & Schwartz-Shea, 1994),
which is consistent with gender stereotypes (e.g., Deaux & Lewis,
1984). Moreover, women are aware of these expectations in social
dilemmas (e.g., Greig & Bohnet, 2009), so this may be considered a
context when men and women may self-regulate their behavior ac-
cording to these expectations.
Although Wood and Eagly (2010) have suggested that women
should primarily display communal oriented behaviors toward
close others, there is reason to believe that the communal orien-
tation of women extends to strangers. Prior research on gender
stereotypes suggests that women are more able to devote them-
selves to others more generally (e.g., Conway et al., 1996; Deaux
& Lewis, 1984; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). Women also self-report
greater importance of universalism values than men, which sug-
gests they extend concern to others beyond close relationships
(Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Although the sociocultural view sug-
gests a main effect of sex on cooperation, gender role stereotypes
may be more or less activated in specific social contexts, and so
sex differences may only appear within these contexts (Deaux &
Major, 1987). Thus, we can examine the implications of this
perspective for context-dependent sex differences in cooperation.
The Evolutionary Perspective
Evolutionary psychology assumes that some sex differences in
social behavior result from unique—but flexible—evolved male
and female psychologies. The argument is that men and women
faced many similar adaptive problems in their ancestral environ-
ments—such as selecting food and finding a safe shelter—but they
also faced some unique adaptive problems that gave rise to sex-
differentiated physical and psychological adaptations (Buss,
2 Although some researchers characterize evolved predispositions as
rigid and inflexible, they are not. Social and ecological conditions are
known to dampen or amplify the extent to which these evolved predispo-
sitions affect decision making (Flinn & Low, 1986; Geary, 2010).
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1995).2 These sex-differentiated adaptations have been shaped
both by the processes of natural and sexual selection.
Naturally selected traits or adaptations reflect strategies to in-
crease one’s survival by dealing with challenges of the natural
environment, such as finding food and avoiding predators. Sexu-
ally selected traits or adaptations may not directly confer survival
benefits but instead help individuals to attract sexual mates (Dar-
win, 1871). Sexual selection comes about through two separate
processes. Whereas intrasexual selection involves members of the
same sex competing among one another to gain access to members
of the opposite sex, intersexual selection refers to external events
or psychological processes that cause members of one sex to
preferentially select characteristics in the opposite sex (Andersson,
1994). Both natural and sexual selection mechanisms have affected
the psychologies of men and women, sometimes resulting in
sex-typical adaptations (Geary, 2010; Geary et al., 2003).
For instance, the majority of modern day and ethnographically
recent foragers maintain a sexual division of labor where men
forage for large packaged resources through hunting, and women
target low-variance resources through gathering (Wood & Eagly,
2002). It is hypothesized that our ancestors did the same, and this
may have produced evolved sex differences in specific cognitive
abilities associated with these roles that are due to natural (Silver-
man & Eals, 1992) or sexual selection (Hawkes & Bliege Bird,
2002). Hunting requires skills related to tracking and killing ani-
mals, whereas gathering requires skills related to locating and
recalling food sources among an array of vegetation. Ancestral
men and women who were successful in these domains provided
more resources to themselves and their offspring and thus gained
a reproductive advantage. Thus, an evolutionary perspective pre-
dicts that men and women possess different psychological adap-
tations to successfully accomplish these sex-differentiated tasks.
Supporting this evolutionary hypothesis, across cultures women
outperform men in the spatial recall of objects—an ability useful
for foraging (Eals & Silverman, 1994; Silverman & Eals, 1992;
Voyer, Postma, Brake, & Imperato-McGinley, 2007), whereas
men outperform women on mental rotation tasks (Voyer, Voyer, &
Bryden, 1995)—an ability relatively more useful for hunting.
When accounting for sex differences in cooperation, the evolu-
tionary perspective assumes that women and men have evolved
different context-specific decision rules that enable each sex to
reap the benefits from interactions with other people in different
environments. That is to say, the evolutionary perspective (like the
sociocultural perspective) suggests that sex differences emerge in
response to specific environmental inputs.
Sex Differences in Cooperation: A Matter of Context?
Research on sex differences in social behavior, guided by each
of these perspectives, supports the general proposition that men
and women may respond differently in social interactions depend-
ing on specific contextual factors (Hyde, 2005). Our research fits
in with these more sophisticated models of sex differences in
social behavior by arguing that men and women show different
cooperation levels in different social decision-making environ-
ments. Although social dilemma studies are conceptually similar in
that they are all concerned with situations involving a conflict
between self-interest and the collective interest, there are several
contextual features that vary systematically between these studies
that may be correlated with sex differences. We identify several of
these in our meta-analytic review of the social dilemma literature
(e.g., sex of the interaction partner, one-shot vs. iterated dilemmas,
group size, and year of publication) and apply both theories to
advance predictions about how these moderators will impact sex
differences in cooperation.
Same-Sex Versus Mixed-Sex Interactions
Do sex differences in cooperation depend on whether interac-
tions occur among same- versus opposite-sex partner(s)? The two
perspectives make different predictions.
According to a sociocultural perspective, boys and girls spend a
significantly greater amount of time interacting with same-sex
others during childhood (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987), and this has
resulted in distinct sex-typical modes of interactions between boys
and girls that may affect sex differences in social behavior even
during adolescence and adulthood (Maccoby, 1990). As Maccoby
(1990) has suggested, girls’ same-sex interactions tend to be more
cooperative and prosocial, whereas boys’ same-sex interactions
tend to place greater emphasis on social dominance. Thus, gender
differences in communal and agentic orientations may be partly
socialized in this context of same-sex peer relationships during
childhood (Maccoby, 1990). If so, we might expect women to
develop a particular style of interacting with other women that
makes their same-sex interactions more cooperative than among
men.
Alternatively, an evolutionarily informed hypothesis predicts
that, compared to women, men are more cooperative during same-
sex interactions. Specifically, men may have evolved a disposition
toward male-to-male cooperation and bonding because coopera-
tion with other men has had important consequences for their
survival and reproductive success (at least in ancestral times).
Specifically, two selective pressures in our ancestral environment
may have selected for male cooperation to overcome social dilem-
mas: hunting and warfare/inter-group conflict (Bowles, 2006,
2009; Foley & Lee, 1989; Geary et al., 2003; Manson & Wrang-
ham, 1991; Wrangham, 1999). The argument is that throughout
human evolutionary history, male coalitions have been an effective
strategy for men to acquire reproductively relevant resources such
as food, territory, and access to mates (Alexander, 1987; Gat,
2006; Guilaine & Zammit, 2004; Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc & Reg-
ister, 2003; Thayer, 2004; Tooby & Cosmides, 1988; Wrangham &
Peterson, 1996). Because evolutionary theorizing suggests that
men have evolved a male coalitional psychology that facilitates
male cooperation, an evolutionary hypothesis predicts that male
same-sex interactions are more cooperative than female same-sex
interactions.
What do these theories suggest about cooperation in mixed-sex
interactions? A sociocultural perspective suggests sex differences
may be more pronounced in contexts when gender stereotypes are
activated (Deaux & Major, 1987). Prior research has found that
gender stereotypes are more activated while interacting with an
opposite-sex partner (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Skrypnek & Snyder,
1982). Men and women may conform to these gender stereotypes
to avoid being negatively evaluated by others (Costrich, Feinstein,
Kidder, Marecek, & Pascale, 1975). Because women are perceived
to be more cooperative than men (e.g., Eagly & Steffen, 1984), this
stereotype may especially influence women to be more coopera-
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tive than men while interacting with an opposite-sex partner,
compared to a same-sex partner (Deaux & Major, 1987). Thus,
women are expected to be even more cooperative than men in
mixed-sex (vs. same-sex) groups.
From an evolutionary perspective, the prediction about mixed-
sex interactions is not so clear. Sexual selection theory (Buss &
Schmitt, 1993) hypothesizes that both sexes have evolved strate-
gies to signal desirable traits to potential opposite sex partners. As
in most mammalian species, women invest more resources in
producing and caring for offspring and so they might signal to
potential mates that they are kind and committed. Being the less
investing sex, men compete more heavily with each other for
mates, and they should therefore be more competitive in the
presence of women. This leads to the prediction that when inter-
acting with women, men may be motivated to signal their social
dominance and therefore should cooperate less in mixed sex
groups.
Yet, sexual selection theory also provides an argument for why
men may be especially cooperative during mixed-sex interactions.
In choosing a sexual partner, women selectively prefer men who
possess resources yet are also committed to sharing these resources
(Phillips, Barnard, Ferguson, & Reader, 2008). Thus, women also
look for cues in men that they are generous and kind, and men
might signal these prosocial qualities by making a cooperative
choice in mixed-sex interactions (Barclay, 2010; Iredale, Van
Vugt, & Dunbar, 2008). We test these different predictions by
considering whether sex differences in cooperation are moderated
by the partner’s sex.
One-Shot Versus Iterated Dilemmas
Do men and women behave differently in response to their
partner’s cooperation or defection? Studies of social dilemmas
allow participants to interact either once with each other (i.e.,
one-shot games) or repeatedly for several trials (i.e., iterated
games). If there is a difference between men’s and women’s
tendencies in the way they respond to their partner’s decisions,
then sex differences should be more pronounced across several
trials of the dilemma. We can examine this in the meta-analysis by
comparing one-shot social dilemmas with iterated social dilem-
mas.
The sociocultural perspective suggests that because women are
relatively more communal than men, women would be expected to
be more accommodating and forgiving of a partner’s defection in
a social dilemma. On the other hand, men, as a result of their
agentic roles, may possess a proclivity to exploit and dominate
and, thus, would be expected to be less forgiving and more
inclined to retaliate. This suggests that over the course of an
interaction with the same partners, women will become more
cooperative, whereas men will become less cooperative (some-
times ending up in a cycle of mutual defection).
Alternatively, according to an evolutionary perspective, men’s
survival and reproductive success were affected by their ability to
form stable cohesive groups, and this may have implications for
sex differences in response to other people’s behavior. Male
groups are maintained through dominance hierarchies (Geary,
2010). Although men may compete to acquire status within group
hierarchies, such hierarchies evolved to facilitate social cohesion
(Buss, 2005; de Waal, 2000; Hemelrijk & Gygax, 2004). Thus,
although men can fight with each other, they may be more tolerant
of defections because of the benefits of prolonged male coopera-
tion (Benenson, 2009; Geary et al., 2003). In fact, there is some
evidence that boys (and men), compared to girls (and women),
have greater tolerance for within-group interpersonal conflict
(Benenson & Christakos, 2003; Benenson et al., 2009; Fehr, Bern-
hard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Whitesell & Harter, 1996). If men are
less likely to respond to defection with subsequent defection, the
level of cooperation over time among men should be higher than
among women.
Group Size
Do men or women differ in cooperation as a function of group
size? The sociocultural perspective suggests that women find close
interpersonal relationships more important for defining their self
concept compared to men (Cross & Madson, 1997), whereas men
tend to value groups in defining their self concept (Baumeister &
Sommer, 1997)—and this perspective predicts relatively greater
male cooperation in larger groups (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). An
evolutionary perspective suggests that men should be more coop-
erative than women in larger groups, because men have more to
gain (and less to lose) from interacting with many other individuals
for the purpose of trading and warfare (Van Vugt, 2009). Thus,
both perspectives predict that men will cooperate more than
women in larger groups (e.g., N-person games). Indeed, relative to
women, men describe themselves more in terms of their group
memberships (McGuire & McGuire, 1982), have larger social
networks (Belle, 1989), and are more inclined to help a group than
a friend (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Our meta-analytic review is
the first to examine the possibility that sex differences in cooper-
ation are moderated by group size.
Year of Publication
Have sex differences in cooperation changed over time? Socio-
cultural theory suggests that sex differences in social behavior
change over time as gender roles change culturally (Diekman &
Eagly, 2008; Eagly & Wood, 2011; Wood & Eagly, 2010). Eagly
and Wood (2011) have argued that relatively recent societal
changes in Western culture—such as an increase in women’s
education, a declining birth rate, and less physical work—remove
obstacles for women to occupy high-status positions in society.
Such societal changes could have influenced different cooperation
rates of men and women over time. For example, there is evidence
to suggest that women have become more similar to men in terms
of their agentic (but not communal) orientation over the last 50
years (Twenge, 1997, 2001). This may reduce potential sex dif-
ferences in cooperation over time. Therefore, we examined
whether sex differences in cooperation have changed over the
course of 50 years of research on social dilemmas.
Overview of the Meta-Analysis
We conducted a meta-analytic review of sex differences in
cooperation with 272 studies on social dilemmas, covering 50
years of research with over 30,000 participants. We first examine
whether there is any overall sex difference in cooperation and then
test for possible moderators. We examine the moderators identified
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above (e.g., sex of partner, iterations, group size, and year of
publication), including a few additional moderators (e.g., type of
social dilemma and country of participants). Lastly, we consider
the possibility that sex of partner influences cooperation, that is,




We searched the PsycINFO database for English written articles
that contained either of the following social dilemma-related
terms: social dilemmas, prisoner’s dilemmas, public goods, or
resource dilemmas. Next, we examined abstracts to identify rele-
vant articles. We subsequently searched directly within the text of
relevant articles for gender or sex. We also searched more gener-
ally for studies using several databases in the social sciences (e.g.,
ABI/INFORM, Business Source Elite, PsycARTICLES, Social
Sciences Citation Index, Google Scholar, Sociological Abstracts,
Web of Science, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, Disserta-
tions Online, and Econlit). We searched the entire text of English
written articles by using the terms: gender, sex, sex differences,
with cooperation, social dilemmas, prisoner’s dilemmas, public
goods, or resource dilemmas. We also searched the references of
all review articles (e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Komorita &
Parks, 1994; Ledyard, 1995; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Simpson
& Van Vugt, 2009; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998; Weber
et al., 2004). Additionally, we searched the text of all articles
reported in prior meta-analyses on behavior in social dilemmas
(Balliet, 2010; Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Balliet et al.,
2009; Balliet & Van Lange, 2011; Sally, 1995). Also, we contacted
several authors who published articles on social dilemmas over the
past 5 years. Lastly, we contacted over 150 experts on social
dilemmas for unpublished data.
There were several criteria for selection. First, all studies had to
have either adolescent or adult participants. Second, all studies had
to report the biological sex of the participants. Third, only studies
using pure social dilemma paradigms were included (i.e., prison-
er’s dilemma, public good, and resource dilemma). Studies on
related economic games—such as ultimatum, dictator, negotiation,
or trust—were excluded. We coded effect sizes for studies that
either involved participants interacting with a confederate, a pre-
programmed strategy, or another participant. Importantly, in all
studies, participants believed they were interacting with other
participants. For articles with multiple studies, we coded an effect
size for each study in the article. This resulted in a total of 203
articles that contained 257 published and 15 unpublished effect
sizes (n  31,462).
Coding of Studies
We had two researchers code each article for several study
characteristics, including partner-sex, number of iterations, group
size, year of publication, type of dilemma, and country of partic-
ipants. Each variable was reliably coded (Cohen’s kappas between
.80 [number of iterations] and 1.00 [year of publication]). When
discrepancies within codings did exist, the researchers read over
each article together and were able to later agree on the coding.
This resulted in 100% agreement for each coded variable.
Same-sex or mixed-sex interactions. Social dilemmas re-
search examines behavior either in same-sex or mixed-sex dyads
or groups. Therefore, we coded whether the study examined co-
operation in same-sex interactions (k  95) or mixed-sex interac-
tions (k  145). In same-sex studies, participants were always led
to believe they were interacting with same-sex partners. However,
in mixed-sex studies, researchers did not control the sex compo-
sition of dyads or groups. These studies involve a mixture of both
same-sex and other-sex interactions. Importantly, in the mixed-sex
studies, participants would come to the laboratory in groups com-
posed of both men and women, and participants did not know who
was assigned to their dyad or group. Studies that involved hypo-
thetical scenarios (e.g., Gabriel & Gardner, 1999), observed dona-
tions to a charity (e.g., Iredale et al., 2008), or reported extensive
procedures to keep participants unaware of their partners identity
(e.g., Hartman, 1974) were coded as “other” (k  32).
One-shot or iterated dilemma. We coded whether partici-
pants either interacted in a one-shot dilemma (n  93) or an
iterated-trial dilemma (k  171). In a few studies, the results
comparing men and women were only reported for the first few
trials (k  4) or the later trials (k  1) of an iterated interaction.
We also coded the number of iterations as a continuous variable
ranging from 2 to 400 (Mode  18, Mdn  24; M  47).
Group size. We coded whether participants were either in a
dyadic social dilemma (k  144) or a dilemma involving three or
more persons (k  118). There were a few studies that asked
participants to donate to a charity or to contribute to a public good
when the number of participants in the dilemma was unknown to
the participant (k  24). These studies were excluded from the
analysis of the effect of group size on the sex–cooperation rela-
tionship. Group size was also coded as a continuous variable.
Groups ranged from two-person interactions to a 175-person
group.
Year of publication. We coded year of publication. For
unpublished data, we recorded either the date on the manuscript or
the date when the data were collected (if reported). The range of
the year of publication was 1961–2010, with the median date being
1993.
Type of dilemma. There are many types of social dilemmas,
but the most common dilemmas in the current analysis include the
prisoner’s dilemma (k  122), public goods or give-some dilemma
(k  82), and the resource or take-some dilemma (k  21). Other
dilemmas were mostly matrix games (e.g., chicken) and were
coded as a separate “other” category (k  48).
Country of participants. A total of 18 countries are repre-
sented in the sample. Most studies were conducted in the United
States (k  177), followed by the Netherlands (k  25), Canada
(k  12), England (k  11), and Japan (k  10). Other countries
represented in the sample include Belgium, Germany, India, Israel,
Kenya, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan.
Age, anonymity, and communication. In the current analy-
sis, most studies were conducted on students (k  247), and of the
studies that reported the average age of participants (k  31), the
average age was 24 years. Also, the majority of studies were
conducted with strangers in the laboratory (k  256), and only a
few studies were done with friends, partners, or with a protocol
that allowed individuals to choose their partner. Lastly, although
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most studies in the present sample did not allow any communica-
tion between participants (k  231), there were a few studies that
either allowed communication or manipulated communication in
the experiment (k  34).3
Overview of Analysis
We used the d value as the measure of effect size. The d value
is the difference between two means divided by the pooled stan-
dard deviation and is corrected for sample size bias (Hedges &
Olkin, 1985). The d value for each study was calculated by using
the mean difference and standard deviations for men versus
women, but when these descriptive statistics were unavailable we
calculated d by using a t score, F score, 2 value, or rates of
cooperation. When a study included a manipulated variable, we
coded the overall main effect of gender across experimental con-
ditions. Women were coded as 1, and men were coded as 2 so that
a positive d value indicates greater cooperation by men, relative to
women, whereas a negative d value is telling of greater coopera-
tion by women compared to men. All results of resource or
take-some dilemmas are reverse coded to indicate that less taking
equals greater cooperation.
Several articles reported a null relationship between sex and
cooperation, but failed to provide the statistics necessary to calcu-
late the effect size. We estimated that these studies had an effect
size of zero. This is a very conservative estimate, as several of
these articles observed a mean difference between men and
women, but lacked the statistical power to detect a small effect size
(e.g., Gallo & Sheposh, 1971; Kershenbaum & Komorita, 1970;
Mack, Auburn, & Knight, 1971; R. R. Miller, 1967; Voissem &
Sistrunk, 1971). Therefore, for all analyses, we first report the
results excluding the null findings coded as zero effect size,
followed by an additional analysis including these estimated null
findings. We report any discrepancies between the actual coded
effect sizes and those analyses including the null estimated effect
sizes.
Some studies allowed us to code several effect sizes. However,
the effect sizes may be non-independent because they share several
methodological features. Therefore, we applied Cooper’s (1998)
shifting-units-of-analysis approach to handling non-independent
effect sizes when conducting moderator analyses. Using this ap-
proach, we averaged over all the effects abstracted from a single
study that shared the same study characteristics. More specifically,
this method creates a single effect size for a study with multiple
effect sizes that share the same coding on a specific moderator. For
example, Sell, Griffith, and Wilson (1993), in a single study, report
two effects sizes based on mixed-sex interactions and one effect
size based on same-sex interactions. When conducting the mod-
erator analysis for same-sex versus mixed-sex interactions, we
averaged the two mixed-sex effect sizes to create a single mixed-
sex effect size for this study. We repeat this procedure for the other
moderator analyses.
In our analysis, we first estimate the overall effect size using a
random effects model, along with both the 95% confidence inter-
val and the 90% prediction interval. We then consider the variation
in the effect size distribution by using several indicators of heter-
ogeneity of variance (T, T2, I2, and Q). Next, we examine the
possibility that the effect size distribution contains a publication
bias. In so doing, we formally examine the distribution of studies
in a funnel plot (plotted according to their effect size and standard
error) using Egger’s regression intercept and Duval and Tweedie’s
(2000) Trim and Fill approach. Following these analyses, we then
use a mixed-effects model to conduct several univariate moderator
analyses of the effect size. We did not apply a fixed or random
effects model to these analyses because (a) we did not assume that
we had gathered all studies from the population of studies, and (b)
we did assume that there would be both systematic and random
variation in the effect size distribution. However, one limitation of
random and mixed-effects models is that they increase the chance
of Type II errors, relative to a fixed-effects model (Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001). Thus, we reported any discrepancies between ran-
dom or mixed-effects analyses and a fixed-effects analysis. Anal-
yses were conducted using Hedges and Olkin’s (1985) approach
with the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Software.
Results
Overall Analysis
Table 1 displays the distribution of effect sizes for sex differ-
ences in cooperation in a stem-and-leaf plot, whereas Table 2
presents the coding and effect size for each study included in the
meta-analysis. As shown in the stem-and-leaf plot, there is a
normal distribution of effect sizes. We found that the relationship
between sex and cooperation in social dilemmas is not statistically
different from zero (d  –0.05, 95% CI [–0.11, 0.001], 90%
prediction interval [–0.52, 0.42]). There is also variation in the true
effect size distribution (T  .29, T2  .08), and a substantial
portion of this variation may be explained by between study
differences (I2  72.54). Moreover, the effect size distribution
contains greater variation than would be expected by chance alone,
Q(175)  637.21, p  .001. Including the estimated null findings
slightly reduced the estimated overall effect size (d  –0.04, 95%
CI [–0.07, 0.000]).
It may be that the sample of studies contains a publication bias.
To examine the possibility of a publication bias, we formally
examined the funnel plot, where all studies were plotted according
to their sample size and standard error, using Duval and Tweedie’s
(2000) Trim and Fill approach. This method examines the sym-
metry of the effect size in the funnel plot and removes the most
extreme small studies from either side of the plot while recalcu-
lating the effect size at each iteration until symmetry is achieved.
In taking this approach, there were no studies filled above the
estimated effect size. However, two studies were filled below the
estimated effect size. This resulted in an estimate of a small
significant negative effect size (d  –0.06, 95% CI [–0.12,
3 Although we include these codings primarily to describe our data set,
we did analyze these variables as potential moderators of the effects size.
We did not find age, stranger, or communication to significantly moderate
the sex–cooperation relationship. However, there is restriction in range of
the age variable. Additionally, for the studies that were coded as using
communication, the effect sizes were coded by averaging over both non-
communication and communication conditions, and therefore this may
have diluted any possible sex differences. Therefore, these analyses are
limited, and future research is still encouraged to examine how age,
communication, and the type of relationship may moderate sex differences
in cooperation.
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–0.001]). Moreover, Egger’s regression analysis resulted in a
non-significant intercept: Intercept  .09, t(174)  0.29, p  .77,
which indicates an absence of bias in the data. Taken together,
these analyses suggest that a publication bias is absent in our data.
We note, however, that the conclusions derived from the above
random-effects estimate differ from the result of the fixed-effects
analysis. Using a fixed-effects analysis, we found that women
were significantly more cooperative than men (d  –0.04, 95% CI
[–0.06, –0.02]). However, this is an exceptionally small effect
size, and the analysis may have resulted in a Type I error. Addi-
tionally, we do not have all the studies in the population of studies,
which violates an assumption of a fixed-effects analysis. Thus, we
conclude that there is no meaningful overall sex difference in
cooperation.
Moderators
In the following section, we first conduct a series of univariate
moderator analyses. For each moderator, we first examine the
effect with only the coded effect sizes and then an additional
analysis including the null findings that were estimated to be zero.
After reporting the univariate tests, we report the correlations
among some of the moderating variables and conduct a multiple
regression model predicting the effect size.
Same-sex versus mixed-sex interactions. The results of the
categorical moderator analyses are presented in Table 3. There is
a statistically significant difference between the effect size esti-
mates in the mixed-sex studies compared to the same-sex studies,
Q(1)  41.16, p  .001. During mixed-sex interactions, women
were more cooperative than men (d  –0.22, 95% CI [–0.29,
–0.15]). However, during same-sex interactions, men were more
cooperative than women (d  0.16, 95% CI [0.06, 0.25]). For
many of the studies coded as mixed-sex dilemmas, researchers did
not control for the sex of participants. In these studies, several
individuals (strangers) came to the laboratory to participate in a
social dilemma. As such, it is likely that some of these data contain
interactions that are based on same-sex groups. Based on this
concern, we conducted a separate analysis only on dyadic inter-
actions, where we can be more certain that studies labeled as
mixed-sex are indeed heterogeneous on sex. For dyadic, mixed-sex
interactions, women were more cooperative than men (d  –0.30,
95% CI [–0.39, –0.21]), whereas for dyadic same-sex interactions,
men were more cooperative than women (d  0.22, 95% CI [0.12,
0.33]), Q(1)  53.83, p  .001. As displayed in Table 3, these
conclusions do not change after introducing the null findings into
the analysis.4
Single versus repeated interactions. We used the number of
iterations as a continuous variable predicting the effect size in a
meta-regression. In the overall sample, we found a statistically
significant positive slope, b  .003, Q(1)  21.10, p  .001,
indicating that men, compared to women, tended to become more
cooperative as iterations continued. To rule out the possibility that
this was due to greater cooperation by women than men in one-
shot interactions, we also examined this relationship excluding
one-shot interactions. When we considered just the iterated inter-
actions, there was still a significant positive effect of the number
of iterations, b  .002, Q(1)  12.05, p  .001. According to the
overall analysis, the estimated effect size of the sex–cooperation
relationship at 100, 200, and 300 iterations is d  0.13, 0.38, and
0.63, respectively. Including the null findings in this analysis does
not eliminate the effect of iterations on the sex–cooperation rela-
tionship. Therefore, these results suggest that as people interact
during repeated social dilemmas, over time men become increas-
ingly more cooperative than women.
Group size. We coded group size as a continuous variable
and used meta-regression with group size predicting the effect size
distribution. Group size had a negative relationship with the sex–
cooperation effect size, b  –.02, Q(1)  4.00, p  .045. This
conclusion remains the same when including the null effect studies
in the analysis.
4 We also examined whether partner gender moderated the sex–
cooperation effect size in each of the separate social dilemma categories.
We found a similar pattern across both the prisoner’s dilemma and the
“other’ category”: Men were more cooperative in same-sex interactions,
but women were more cooperative in mixed-sex interactions. However, for
public goods dilemmas, the nine same-sex studies (d  –0.07) did not
differ from the 33 mixed-sex studies (d  –0.06). Unfortunately, the
resource dilemmas only included mixed-sex studies.
Table 1
Stem-and-Leaf Diagram of the Overall Distribution of Effect
Sizes for Sex Differences in Cooperation









0.7 0 0 0 3 5 5 7 8
0.6 0 5 7 9
0.5 0 2 3 3 4 5 7 7
0.4 0 0 7 7 7 9 9
0.3 0 1 3 5 5 6 6 8
0.2 0 0 0 2 3 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 8 9
0.1 0 0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 6
0.0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9
0.1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 9 9
0.2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 6 7 8 8
0.3 0 0 1 1 2 4 5 6 6 6 7 7
0.4 0 3 3 3 5 6 6 6 7 7
0.5 0 0 1 2 3 5 6 6 7 7
0.6 0 0 1 2 3 5 8
0.7 2 5 6 6
0.8 5 7







Note. This plot omits three outliers: 1.65, 1.76, and 1.90. This plot
only includes the 176 effect sizes that were coded and does not include the
null effect studies that were estimated to have zero effect size.
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Table 2
Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis
Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
Ahmed (2008) 180 SE PD MIXED 2 OS 0.21 0.50, 0.09
Alcock & Mansell (1977) 60 CA PD MIXED 10 IT(30) 0.11 0.70, 0.46
Andersen et al. (2008) 80 IN PGD MIXED N/A OS 0.20 0.64, 0.24
Study 2 51 IN PGD MIXED N/A OS 0.61 1.68, 0.01
Study 3 61 IN PGD MIXED N/A OS 0.21 0.71, 0.70
Andreoni & Petrie (2008) 80 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(40) 0.29 0.15, 0.73
Ando (1999) 36 JP PGD MIXED 9 IT(3) 0.00 0.68, 0.68
Anthony & Horne (2003) 298 US O MIXED 6 N/A 0.43 0.66, 0.20
Aranoff & Tedeschi (1968) 216 US PD SAME 2 IT(200) 0.00 0.27, 0.27
Baker & Rachlin (2001) 48 US PD N/A N/A IT(100) 0.00 0.58, 0.58
Study 2 48 US PD N/A N/A IT(100) 0.00 0.58, 0.58
Study 3 48 US PD MIXED 2 IT(100) 0.00 0.58, 0.58
Balliet (2009) 55 SG PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.09 0.63, 0.46
Batson et al. (1995) 120 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(2) 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Study 2 45 US PGD SAME 4 IT(2) 0.00 0.61, 0.61
W. M. Becker & Miles (1978) 297 US O MIXED 2 OS 0.87 1.12, 0.62
Bedell & Sistrunk (1973) 60 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.70 0.18, 1.22
Belianin & Novarese (2005) 24 RU PGD MIXED 6 IT(12) 1.90 2.87, 0.93
Belot et al. (2006) 138 NL PD MIXED 2 OS 0.43 0.80, 0.05
Belot et al. (2010) 138 NL PD MIXED 2 OS 0.33 0.67, 0.001
Bixenstine et al. (1964) 64 US O SAME 2 IT(160) 0.28 0.26, 0.83
Bixenstine & Garebelein (1971) 100 US PD SAME 2 IT(150) 0.00 0.40, 0.40
Bixenstine & O’Reilly (1966) 80 US PD SAME 2 IT(60) 0.54 0.09, 0.98
Bixenstine et al. (1963) 48 US PD SAME 2 IT(30/90) 0.05 0.52, 0.61
Bixenstine & Wilson (1963) 80 US PD SAME 2 IT(190) 0.00 0.45, 0.45
Black & Higbee (1973) 72 US O SAME 2 IT(150) 0.00 0.47, 0.47
Bonacich (1972) 120 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(5) 0.30 0.79, 0.20
Boone et al. (1999) 40 NL PD MIXED 2 IT(5) 0.00 0.64, 0.64
Boone et al. (2010) 112 BE PD MIXED 2 OS 0.13 0.50, 0.23
Brickman et al. (1979) 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 0.08 0.69, 0.53
Sample b 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 0.65 0.03, 1.27
Sample c 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 1.53 0.85, 2.22
Sample d 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 0.94 1.57, 0.30
Sample e 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 1.53 2.22, 0.84
Sample f 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 1.14 0.49, 1.79
A. Brown (2006) 61 US TS MIXED 4 OS 0.20 0.74, 0.33
A. Brown & Stasser (2004) 41 US TS MIXED 4 OS 0.72 1.37, 0.07
K. M. Brown & Taylor (2000) 242 US PGD N/A N/A OS 0.26 0.00, 0.51
Study 2 242 US PGD N/A N/A OS 0.33 0.07, 0.58
Brown-Kruse & Hummels (1993) 64 US PGD SAME 4 IT(6) .50 0.00, 1.00
Buchan et al. (2009) 1,029 N/A PGD MIXED 12 IT 0.04 0.16, 0.08
Cadsby et al. (2007) 160 CA/JP PGD SAME 10 IT(25) 0.14 0.45, 0.17
Cadsby & Maynes (1998) 220 CA PGD SAME 10 IT(1/25) 0.23 0.49, 0.04
Caldwell (1976) 130 US PD SAME 5 IT(80) 0.00 0.35, 0.35
W. K. Campbell et al. (2005) 232 US TS MIXED 4 IT(25) 0.36 0.63, 0.09
Study 2 166 US TS MIXED 4 IT(25) 0.32 0.64, 0.001
Carment (1974) 66 CA O SAME 2 IT(100) 0.31 0.24, 0.87
Charness & Rustichini (2010) 160 US PD SAME 2 OS 0.01 0.26, 0.24
Study 2 74 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.23 0.61, 0.12
M. L. Clark (1983) 40 US PD MIXED 2 IT(30) 0.96 0.29, 2.83
Sample 2 40 US PD MIXED 2 IT(30) 0.70 1.33, 2.14
K. Clark & Sefton (2001) 120 UK PD MIXED 2 OS 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Cohen et al. (2010) 172 US PD SAME 2 OS 0.02 0.32, 0.28
Study 2 130 US PD SAME 2 OS 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Conrath (1972) 84 US O SAME 4–6 IT(32) 0.10 0.19, 0.02
Corfman & Lehmann (1994) 227 US PD N/A 2 OS 0.47 0.74, 0.20
Croson et al. (2008) 150 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(25 0.00 0.32, 0.32
Crowne (1966) 34 US PD SAME 2 IT(20) 0.80 0.12, 1.50
Dawes et al. (1977) 284 US O MIXED 8 OS 0.17 0.42, 0.08
Study 2 160 US O MIXED 8 OS 0.30 0.62, 0.01
Declerck et al. (2010) 131 BE PD MIXED 2 OS 0.10 0.45, 0.24
Study 2 128 BE PD MIXED 2 OS 0.15 0.51, 0.19
(table continues)
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Table 2 (continued)
Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
De Cremer & Van Dijk (2009) 148 NL PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.00 0.33, 0.33
Study 2 114 NL PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.00 0.37, 0.37
Study 3 110 NL PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.00 0.38, 0.38
Dolbear et al. (1969) 46 US PD MIXED 2 N/A 0.00 0.60, 0.60
Drouvelis et al. (2010) 54 UK PGD MIXED 3 OS 0.55 0.47, 0.16
Eek & Biel (2003) 68 SE PGD MIXED 4 IT(33) 0.00 0.49, 0.49
Enzle et al. (1992) 134 CA PD MIXED 2 IT(40) 0.00 0.34, 0.34
Evans & Crumbaugh (1966) 20 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.20 0.81, 1.20
Farrelly et al. (2007) 231 UK PD MIXED 2 OS 0.00 0.26, 0.26
Ferguson & Schmitt (1988) 40 US PD SAME 2 IT(30) 0.12 0.84, 0.60
Ferrin et al. (2008) 68 US PD SAME 2 IT(3) 0.10 0.38, 0.57
Study 2 68 US PD SAME 3 IT(3) 0.40 0.08, 0.88
Fisher & Smith (1969) 120 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.46 0.98, 0.05
Fleishman (1988) 170 US PGD SAME 5 IT(5) 0.00 0.30, 0.30
Fox & Guyer (1978) 80 CA PD SAME 4 IT(30) 0.05 0.67, 0.57
Frank et al. (1993) 207 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.52 0.81, 0.25
Fundenberg et al. (2010) 274 US PD MIXED 2 IT(8) 0.40 0.64, 0.16
Gabriel & Gardner (1999) 137 US PGD N/A N/A OS 0.25 0.08, 0.59
Study 2 137 US O N/A 2 OS 0.35 0.69, 0.01
Gallo et al. (1969) 20 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.15 0.98, 1.28
Gallo & Sheposh (1971) 120 US PD SAME 2 IT(20) 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Garza & Borchert (1990) 84 US PGD MIXED 6 IT(20) 0.46 0.89, 0.03
Gillis & Woods (1971) 98 CA PD N/A 2 IT(20) 0.46 0.86, 0.06
Goehring & Kahan (1976) 60 US PD SAME 3 IT(150) 0.03 0.48, 0.53
Granberg & Stevens (1975) 96 US O SAME 2 IT(60) 0.30 0.10, 0.70
Grant & Sermat (1969) 48 CA O MIXED 2 IT(60) 0.00 0.57, 0.57
Greig & Bohnet (2009) 270 KE PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.22 0.08, 0.51
Hamburger et al. (1975) 160 US PD SAME 5 IT(150) 0.00 0.31, 0.31
Hardy & van Vugt (2006) 62 UK PGD MIXED 3 IT(25) 0.49 0.02, 0.99
Hartman (1974) 128 US PD N/A 2 IT(50/100) 0.09 0.30, 0.47
Hartman (1980) 128 US PD SAME 2 IT(25) 0.00 0.35, 0.35
Hemesath & Pomponio (1998) 30 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.59 1.33, 0.13
Holm (2000) 87 SE O SAME 2 IT(2) 0.35 0.15, 0.84
Sample b 58 SE O MIXED 2 IT(2) 0.76 1.42, 0.10
Study 2 85 SE O SAME 2 IT(2) 0.00 0.47, 0.47
Sample b 86 SE O MIXED 2 IT(2) 0.98 1.50, 0.46
Study 3 40 US O SAME 2 IT(2) 0.07 0.43, 0.50
Sample b 86 US O MIXED 2 IT(2) 0.76 1.33, 0.22
Hopthrow et al. (2007) 158 UK PD MIXED 4 IT(4) 0.00 0.32, 0.32
Horai & Tedeschi (1969) 90 US PD SAME 2 IT(150) 0.00 0.42, 0.42
Horai & Tedeschi (1975) 60 US PD MIXED 2 IT(60) 0.00 0.52, 0.52
Hottes & Kahn (1974) 60 US PD SAME 2 IT(180) 0.86 0.33, 1.38
Hu & Liu (2003) 255 TW PD MIXED 2 OS 0.47 0.73, 0.22
Huntoon (2006) 333 US PGD MIXED 5 OS 0.02 0.20, 0.24
Insko et al. (1987) 260 US O MIXED N/A IT(10) 0.00 0.25, 0.25
Insko et al. (1993) 77 US O SAME N/A OS 0.00 0.46, 0.46
Insko et al. (2005) 292 US O SAME N/A OS 0.00 0.23, 0.23
Study 2 258 US O SAME N/A OS 0.00 0.26, 0.26
Iredale et al. (2008) 30 UK PGD N/A N/A OS 0.26 1.00, 0.49
Jackson (2001) 200 US PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.00 0.28, 0.28
Jackson (2008) 66 US PGD MIXED 6 OS 0.00 0.49, 0.49
James et al. (2001) 33 CA PD MIXED 3 OS 1.17 1.95, 0.39
Jaster & Arrow (2010) 324 US PGD MIXED N/A IT(6) 0.20 0.42, 0.03
Kahn et al. (1971) 40 US PD SAME 2 IT(75) 0.00 0.64, 0.64
Study 2 80 US PD SAME 2 IT(75) 0.00 0.45, 0.45
Kamas et al. (2008) 162 US PGD MIXED N/A OS 0.62 0.94, 0.31
Kanouse & Wiest (1967) 187 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.13 0.43, 0.15
Kennelly & Fantino (2007) 238 US O N/A 2 IT(20) 0.38 0.05, 0.70
Study 2 156 US O N/A 2 IT(20) 0.36 0.04, 0.68
Kershenbaum & Komorita
(1970) 96 US PD SAME 2 IT(40) 0.00 0.41, 0.41
Kiesler et al. (1996) 86 US PD N/A 2 IT(6) 0.00 0.43, 0.43
Knight (1980) 96 US PD MIXED 2 IT(100) 0.00 0.41, 0.41
Komorita (1965) 74 US PD SAME 2 IT(80) 0.73 1.10, 0.02
Study 2 54 US PD SAME 2 IT(80) 0.56 1.10, 0.02
Komorita & Mechling (1967) 64 US PD SAME 2 IT(4/10) 0.00 0.50, 0.50
Kortenkamp & Moore (2006) 112 US TS MIXED N/A OS 0.65 1.07, 0.23
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Table 2 (continued)
Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
Kramer & Brewer (1984) 58 US TS MIXED 6 IT(12) 0.00 0.53, 0.53
Study 2 48 US TS MIXED 6 IT(24) 0.00 0.58, 0.58
Study 3 66 US TS MIXED 6 IT(24) 0.00 0.49, 0.49
Kube & Traxler (2009) 96 DE PGD MIXED 4 IT(11) 0.00 0.41, 0.41
Kuhlman & Marshello (1975) 167 US PD SAME 2 IT(30) 0.00 0.31, 0.31
Kümmerli et al. (2007) 30 CH PD MIXED 2 IT(12) 1.04 1.84, 0.24
Kurzban (2001) 57 US PGD SAME 6 IT(10) 0.10 0.33, 0.13
Kurzban & Houser (2001) 72 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(15) 0.47 0.96, 1.91
Kuwabara (2005) 122 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.11 0.29, 0.51
Lacy (1978) 236 US PD SAME 2 IT(1/20) 0.11 0.42, 0.20
Liebrand (1984) 261 NL TS MIXED 7 IT(5) 0.36 0.70, 0.01
Study 2 132 NL TS MIXED 20 IT(5) 0.62 1.03, .22
Liebrand & Van Run (1985) 270 US/NL TS MIXED 6–7 IT(5) 0.31 0.55, 0.06
Lindskold et al. (1986) 128 US PD SAME 2 IT(40) 0.00 0.35, 0.35
Study 2 57 US PD SAME 2 IT(40) 0.00 0.53, 0.53
Lindskold et al. (1977) 54 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.31 0.59, 0.03
Sample b 135 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.00 0.34, 0.34
Study 2 168 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.00 0.31, 0.31
List (2006) 134 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.24 0.53, 0.04
Lutzker (1961) 40 US O MIXED 2 IT(30) 0.00 0.12, 0.13
Mack et al. (1971) 48 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.78 0.19, 1.36
Mack et al. (1979) 20 UK PD N/A 2 IT(100) 1.75 2.79, 0.72
Majolo et al. (2006) 20 UK PD SAME 2 IT(15) 0.00 0.95, 0.95
Marwell et al. (1971) 32 US O SAME 2 IT(12) 0.75 0.07, 1.57
Study 2 22 US O SAME 2 IT(12) 1.65 0.68, 2.62
Mason et al. (1991) 82 US O MIXED 2 IT(25) 0.23 0.69, 0.23
McCallum et al. (1985) 180 US PD SAME 2 IT(10) 0.00 0.30, 0.30
Study 2 124 US O SAME 4 IT(10) 0.00 0.36, 0.36
McClintock et al. (1965) 36 US O SAME 2 IT(30) 0.00 0.68, 0.68
McClintock & Liebrand (1988) 129 US PD MIXED 2 IT(30) 0.00 0.35, 0.35
McKeown et al. (1967) 60 US O MIXED 2 IT(100) 0.00 0.52, 0.52
McNeel et al. (1972) 96 BE O SAME 2 IT(100) 0.21 0.61, 0.19
Meeker (1984) 18 US PD SAME 2 IT(400) 1.30 0.26, 2.34
Meier (2005) 532 CH PGD N/A N/A OS 0.27 0.10, 0.44
Meux (1973) 170 US O MIXED 12 IT(50) 0.00 0.30, 0.30
Miermin (1976) 90 US O SAME 3 IT(30) 0.16 0.10, 0.23
R. R. Miller (1967) 120 US O SAME 2 IT(25) 0.00 0.36, 0.36
G. H. Miller & Pyke (1973) 82 CA O MIXED 2 IT 0.60 1.05, 0.16
Millet & Dewitte (2007) 173 BE PGD MIXED 4 IT(3) 0.00 0.30, 0.30
Mitani & Flores (2007) 45 JP PGD MIXED 5 IT(10) 0.50 1.10, 0.09
L. B. Mulder (2008) 114 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.08 0.41, 0.88
L. B. Mulder (2010) 50 NL TS N/A 4 OS 0.11 0.68, 0.46
L. B. Mulder & Nelissen (2010) 133 NL TS MIXED N/A OS 0.16 0.51, 0.18
Study 2 119 NL TS MIXED N/A OS 0.28 0.66, 0.10
L. B. Mulder et al. (2006a) 50 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.13 0.79, 0.51
Study 2 113 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.53 0.16, 0.91
Study 3 100 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.16 0.25, 0.56
L. B. Mulder et al. (2006b) 52 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.41 0.14, 0.95
Study 2 78 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.20 0.25, 0.64
L. B. Mulder et al. (2009) 36 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.35 0.31, 1.01
Murnighan & Roth (1983) 252 US PD MIXED 2 N/A 0.00 0.25, 0.25
Nowell & Tinkler (1994) 44 US PGD SAME 4 IT(13) 0.75 1.98, 0.45
Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010) 188 NL O MIXED 3 OS 0.15 0.47, 0.16
Oda (1997) 70 JP PD MIXED 2 OS 0.16 0.64, 0.32
Orbell et al. (1994) 108 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.19 0.59, 0.22
Study 2 68 US PD MIXED 2 OS† 0.10 0.57, 0.36
Ortmann & Tichy (1999) 96 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.27 0.44, 0.09
Orwant & Orwant (1970) 165 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.28 0.60, 0.04
Oskamp & Kleinke (1970) 100 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.57 0.18, 0.58
Oskamp & Perlaman (1965) 32 US PD SAME 2 IT(30) 1.18 0.43, 1.93
Patterson & Boles (1974) 72 US PD MIXED 2 IT(16) 0.00 0.47, 0.47
Perugini et al. (2005) 108 DE PGD MIXED 3 IT(10) 0.43 0.82, 0.05
Pilisuk et al. (1968) 176 US PD MIXED 2 IT(25) 0.08 0.24, 0.39
Poppe (2005) 91 US PGD MIXED 175 IT(9) 0.00 0.42, 0.42
Poppe & Utens (1986) 90 NL TS MIXED 6 IT(16) 0.00 0.42, 0.42
Pruitt (1967) 100 US O SAME 2 IT(1/20) 0.69 0.23, 1.15
Putterman et al. (2010) 80 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(24) 0.00 0.45, 0.45
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Table 2 (continued)
Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
Rapoport (1988) 69 CA PD MIXED 2 OS 0.03 0.03, 0.45
Rapoport & Chammah (1965) 140 US PD SAME 2 IT(300) 0.57 0.19, 0.94
Reich & Purbhoo (1975) 57 CA PD MIXED 2 IT(50) 0.00 0.53, 0.53
Rooney et al. (2005) 1,409 US PGD N/A N/A N/A 0.20 0.31, 0.10
Ruffle & Sosis (2007) 212 IL TS N/A 2 OS 0.23 0.04, 0.50
Sanna et al. (2003) 110 US TS MIXED 2 IT(5) 0.00 0.38, 0.38
Study 2 83 US TS MIXED 2 IT(5) 0.00 0.44, 0.44
Study 3 75 US PD MIXED 2 IT(10) 0.00 .46, 0.46
Study 4 94 US TS MIXED 2 IT(5) 0.00 0.41, .041
Seguino et al. (1996) 139 US PGD MIXED 5–52 OS 0.51 0.87, 0.17
Sell (1997) 82 US PGD N/A 4 IT(18) 0.25 0.18, .067
Study 1b 83 US PGD SAME 4 IT(18) 0.45 .88, .10
Study 1c 79 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.47 0.02, 0.92
Sell et al. (1993) 22 US PGD N/A 4 IT(18) 0.09 0.92, 0.75
Study 1b 26 US PGD SAME 4 IT(18) 0.55 0.23, 1.33
Study 1c 25 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.52 0.28, 1.32
Study 1d 26 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.15 0.92, 0.63
Study 2 25 US PGD N/A 4 IT(18) 0.53 0.27, 1.33
Study 2b 26 US PGD SAME 4 IT(18) 0.70 0.10, 1.49
Study 2c 25 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.98 0.15, 1.82
Study 2d 30 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.63 0.08, 1.42
Sell & Wilson (2001) 96 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(10) 0.49 0.06, 0.93
Sermat (1967) 32 US O SAME 2 IT(200) 0.26 0.20, 0.31
Setzman (1974) 40 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.11 0.83, 0.61
Sheldon (1999) 90 US PD MIXED 2 IT(15) 0.00 0.42, 0.42
Sheldon & McGregor (2000) 80 US TS N/A 4 OS 0.00 0.45, 0.45
Study 2 152 US TS MIXED 4 IT(N/A) 0.00 0.32, 0.32
Shinada & Yamagishi (2007) 157 JP PD MIXED 3 OS 0.00 0.32, 0.32
Study 2 144 JP PD MIXED 3 OS 0.00 0.33, 0.33
Shomer et al. (1966) 64 US O SAME 2 IT(15) 0.60 0.10, 1.10
Sibley et al. (1968) 24 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.84 1.68, 0.01
Simpson (2003) 82 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.00 0.49, 0.49
Study 2 70 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.14 0.39, 0.67
Simpson & Macy (2004) 114 US O MIXED 4 IT(15) 0.00 0.37, 0.37
Skotko et al. (1974) 134 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.36 0.02, 0.70
Small & Loewenstein (2005) 140 US PGD MIXED 10 OS 0.00 0.34, 0.34
E. R. Smith et al. (2003) 143 US PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.13 0.20, 0.46
Study 2 209 US PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.10 0.17, 0.37
Study 3 155 US PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.06 0.26, 0.39
N. S. Smith et al. (1975) 96 US PD MIXED 2 IT(60) 0.50 1.08, 0.07
Solow & Krikwood (2002) 125 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(10) 0.47 0.11, 0.82
Speer (1972) 60 US PD MIXED 2 IT(75) 0.11 0.04, 0.17
Steele & Tedeschi (1967) 84 US O SAME 2 IT(300) 0.75 0.28, 1.21
Study 2 84 US O SAME 2 IT(300) 0.00 0.44, 0.44
Stockard et al. (1988) 594 US/CA PGD MIXED 9 OS 0.08 0.54, 0.39
Study 2 100 US/CA PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.23 0.67, 0.21
Surbey & McNally (1997) 150 CA PD MIXED 2 OS 0.36 0.69, 0.04
Swingle (1970) 60 US O SAME 2 IT(150) 0.00 0.52, 0.52
Swope et al. (2008) 48 US PD N/A 2 OS 0.07 0.75, 0.62
Takahashi et al. (2006) 99 JP PD MIXED 2 OS 0.07 0.46, 0.33
Tedeschi et al. (1970) 30 US PD MIXED 2 IT(150) 0.92 1.67, 0.17
Tedeschi et al. (1968) 64 US PD MIXED 2 IT(10) 0.50 1.00, 0.01
Tedeschi et al. (1969) 50 US PD MIXED 2 IT(20) 0.68 1.25, 0.11
Van Egeren (1979) 16 US PD SAME 2 IT(45) 0.12 0.00, 0.23
Study 2 16 US PD SAME 2 IT(45) 0.05 0.07, 0.12
Van Lange (1999) 196 NL PD MIXED 2 OS 0.00 0.28, 0.28
Van Vugt et al. (2007) 93 UK PGD MIXED 6 OS 0.37 0.79, 0.05
Study 2 120 UK PGD MIXED 6 OS 0.26 0.10, 0.63
Study 3 90 UK PGD MIXED 6 IT(6) 0.57 1.00, 0.13
Vinacke et al. (1974) 144 US PD SAME 3 IT(10) 0.74 1.08, 0.40
Voissem & Sistrunk (1971) 96 US PD SAME 2 IT(101) 0.00 0.41, 0.41
Wiley (1973) 64 US PD SAME 2 IT(20) 0.04 0.17, 0.07
Willer (2009) 72 US PGD MIXED 6 IT(5) 0.00 0.47, 0.47
Study 2 41 US PGD MIXED 6 OS 0.00 0.64, 0.64
Study 3 97 US PGD MIXED 6 IT(10) 0.00 0.40, 0.40
Study 4 86 US PGD MIXED 6 IT(5) 0.00 0.43, 0.43
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Year of publication. We coded year of publication as a
continuous variable and used meta-regression to examine its effect
on the sex–cooperation relationship. The analysis indicated a
statistically significant negative relationship between year of pub-
lication and the effect size, b  –.005, Q(1)  6.30, p  .01. This
continued to be significant after including the null findings. This
result indicates that sex differences in cooperation significantly
diminished over time. Specifically, the tendency for men to be
more cooperative than women during the 1960s has significantly
diminished, if not reversed. To illustrate, in studies conducted
between 1960 and 1975, men were slightly more cooperative than
women (d  0.11), but between 1976 and 1999 and between 2000
to 2010, women were more cooperative than men (d  –0.12, and
d  –0.09, respectively).
Type of dilemma. We found a statistical difference between
the three types of dilemmas, Q(2)  11.96, p  .003. First, there
was no sex difference in the public goods dilemma (d  0.01, 95%
CI [–0.08, 0.10]). Second, women were marginally more cooper-
ative than men in the prisoner’s dilemma (d  –0.08, 95% CI
[–0.16, 0.007]). However, women displayed a statistically greater
amount of cooperation than men in the resource dilemma (d 
–0.30, 95% CI [–0.45, –0.14]). As displayed in Table 3, including
the null effects did not change the qualitative conclusions of this
analysis.
Country of participants. We examined whether there were
any differences between countries that were represented by at least
seven studies in the sample. There were no statistically significant
difference between countries, Q(4)  8.61, p  .07. As displayed
in Table 3, men and women displayed equal levels of cooperation
in the United States, Netherlands, Japan, and England. However,
women were more cooperative than men in Canada (d  –0.26,
95% CI [–0.45, –0.06]). The comparison between Canada and the
United States is significant, Q(1)  5.51, p  .02. These findings
were the same after including the null results in the analysis.
Multiple regression model. It could be that gender compo-
sition and iterations predict the sex–cooperation effect size be-
cause these variables are confounded with other methodological
features. In fact, as displayed in Table 4, gender composition has
a significant correlation with the number of iterations, year of
publication, and the type of dilemma. Number of iterations is also
Table 2 (continued)
Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
Wit & Kerr (2002) 60 US O N/A 6 OS 0.00 0.52, 0.52
Study 2 120 US O N/A 6 OS 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Study 3 100 US O N/A 6 OS 0.00 0.40, 0.40
Wit & Wilke (1992) 570 NL PGD MIXED 100 OS 0.00 0.17, 0.17
Wit & Wilke (1998) 104 NL PGD N/A 100 OS 0.00 0.39, 0.39
Yamagishi (1986) 192 JP PGD SAME 4 IT(12) 0.00 0.29, 0.29
Yamagishi et al. (2005) 106 JP/AU PD N/A 2 OS 0.00 0.39, 0.39
Yamagishi & Mifune (2009) 131 JP PD SAME 2 OS 0.21 0.56, 0.12
Yamagishi et al. (2007) 105 JP PD N/A 2 OS 0.77 0.20, 1.34
Note. N  number of participants in study. An asterisk indicates that a study reported a null finding and that the effect size is estimated as zero. CO 
country; DV  dependent variable; SAME  same-sex pairs or groups; MIXED  mixed-sex pairs or groups; GS  group size in social dilemma; OS 
one-shot dilemma; IT(##)  iterated dilemma (number of iterations); LL  lower limit; UL  upper limit; SE  Sweden; CA  Canada; IN  India; US 
United States; JP  Japan; SG  Singapore; RU  Russia; NL  the Netherlands; BE  Belgium; KE  Kenya; UK  United Kingdom; TW  Taiwan;
DE  Germany; CH  Switzerland; IL  Israel; AU  Australia; PD  prisoner’s dilemma; PGD  give-some game or public goods dilemma; O 
Other; TS  take-some game or resource dilemma; N/A  not applicable.
Table 3
Results of the Univariate Categorical Moderator Analyses
Variable and class k (k with null estimates) d (d with null estimates) T (T with null estimates)
Sex of partner(s)
Same 58 (89) 0.16 (0.09) .27 (.19)
Mixed 90 (144) 0.22 (0.14) .25 (.19)
Sex of partner (dyads only)
Same 44 (66) 0.22 (0.13) .25 (.19)
Mixed 42 (62) 0.30 (0.20) .22 (.19)
Type of dilemma
Public goods dilemma 58 (81) 0.01 (0.01) .26 (.20)
Prisoner’s dilemma 74 (115) 0.08 (0.05) .29 (.21)
Take-some dilemma 12 (21) 0.30 (0.18) .19 (.15)
Country of participants
United States 108 (172) 0.02 (0.003) .32 (.23)
Canada 10 (12) 0.26 (0.21) .20 (.19)
Japan 6 (10) 0.10 (0.05) .24 (.11)
United Kingdom 7 (11) 0.18 (0.15) .25 (.30)
Netherlands 15 (25) 0.11 (0.05) .25 (.14)
 p  .05.
13SEX DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATION
correlated with the year of publication. To examine whether gen-
der composition and number of iterations are no longer signifi-
cantly related to the sex–cooperation relationship after controlling
for the variance explained by these other methodological features,
we conducted a random-effects multiple regression analysis in
SPSS using the syntax provided by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). The
model predicting the effect size included the variables, mixed
(coded as 1) versus same-sex interactions (coded as 2), number of
iterations, group size, year of publication, and type of dilemma
(public goods and prisoner’s dilemmas were coded as 1, and
resource dilemmas were coded as 2). To conduct a relatively
conservative analysis, we included the null findings that were
coded as zero effect. The overall model explained a significant
amount of variation in the effect size distribution, R2  .10, Q(5,
173)  41.75, p  .001. Supporting the prior analyses, gender
composition was significantly positively related to the sex–
cooperation relationship (  .18, p  .003). The positive rela-
tionship between the number of iterations and the effect size also
remained significant (  .18, p  .004). As before, this analysis
suggests that men were more cooperative than women in same-sex
groups and over several iterations, whereas women were more
cooperative than men in mixed-sex groups. However, when we
controlled for the variance explained by these two variables, then
group size, year of publication, and type of dilemma were no
longer significantly related to the effect size. This is likely due to
some confounding between the study characteristics.5
Sex of Partner and Cooperation: Ruling Out an
Alternative Explanation
Lastly, we note that the greater cooperation between male–male
dyads versus female–female dyads as well as greater female than
male cooperation in mixed dyads might be due to people being
generally more cooperative with men than women. To tease apart
whether partner sex could be underlying such sex differences, we
examined whether both men and women are more generally in-
clined to cooperate with either male or female partners. Of the
studies that reported sex differences in cooperation, only 10 studies
reported the main effect of sex of partner on cooperation. The
effect sizes of these studies are reported in Table 5. The overall
effect indicates that individuals were more cooperative while in-
teracting with women compared to men (d  –0.38, 95% CI
[–0.002, –0.75]). Although there is heterogeneity in the effect size
distribution (T  .57, T2  .32), which can potentially be ex-
plained by between study differences (I2  91.23), we refrain from
exploring moderators of this relationship due to the low sample
size.
This effect, however, may be due to a publication bias. In fact,
several statistics raise our concerns about a possible publication
bias. First, Egger’s regression intercept is marginally significant,
t(8)  1.95, p  .08. Second, applying Duval and Tweedie’s
(2000) Trim and Fill approach, two studies were trimmed below
the mean and this resulted in a lager estimated effect size (d 
–0.59, 95% CI [–1.02, –0.16]). There were no studies trimmed
above the mean. Lastly, calculating Orwin’s fail-safe N suggests
only 33 studies with a value of d  –0.05 would reduce the effect
size to non-significance. According to Hedges and Olkin (1985), to
ensure confidence in the results, Orwin’s fail-safe N should be 5
times the number of studies (here, 5  10  50) plus 10 (50 
10  60). Because this small sample of effect sizes may contain a
publication bias, the current results are relatively inconclusive
regarding the main effect of partner sex on cooperation. Never-
theless, they reduce our concern that our earlier analyses can be
explained by people being more cooperative with men than
women.
Discussion
This meta-analytic review examined sex differences in cooper-
ation using the extant literature on social dilemmas—situations
5 We also examined the interactions between partner sex with either the
number of iterations, group size, or year of publication. We found statis-
tically significant two-way interactions between partner sex and both group
size and year of publication predicting the effect size. Follow-up analyses
suggested that among same-sex interactions, both group size and year of
publication were negatively related to the effect size (  –.19, p  .005;
  –.19, p  .002, respectively). However, for mixed-sex interactions,
both group size and year of publication were unrelated to the effect size
(  .06, p  .33;   .02, p  .71, respectively). Among all the same-sex
studies, however, the moderators are still correlated. Therefore, we con-
ducted a multiple regression model using only the studies coded as same-
sex to see whether both year of publication and group size remain signif-
icant predictors of the effect size after controlling for the number of
iterations. After controlling for the number of iterations, both year of
publication and group size were non-significant predictors of the same-sex
study effect sizes, whereas the number of iterations continued to predict the
effect size (  .28, p  .002).
Table 4
Correlations Between Study Characteristics
Study characteristic 1 2 3 4 5
1. Gender composition —
2. No. of iterations .42 —
3. Group size .13 .09 —
4. Year of publication .51 .55 .08 —
5. Type of dilemma .20 .09 .02 .10 —
Note. Gender composition: mixed-sex studies  1, same-sex studies  2;
type of dilemma: prisoner’s dilemma and public goods dilemmas  1,
resource dilemmas  2.
 p  .05.
Table 5
Studies Reporting the Relationship Between Partner Sex and
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Study n d LL, UL
Carment (1974) 66 0.71 1.23, 0.19
M. L. Clark (1983) 120 0.35 0.01, 0.71
Ferguson & Schmitt (1988) 40 2.65 3.25, 2.05
Grant & Sermat (1969) 48 0.76 1.35, 0.18
Orbell et al. (1994) 94 0.18 0.56, 0.20
Study 2 68 0.04 0.42, 0.34
Pilisuk et al. (1968) 176 0.13 0.44, 0.19
N. S. Smith et al. (1975) 96 0.07 0.07, 0.21
Takahashi et al. (2006) 99 0.58 0.99, 0.18
Wiley (1968) 96 0.41 0.01, 0.81
Note. LL  lower limit; UL  upper limit.
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involving a conflict between maximizing personal versus collec-
tive interests (“mixed motive” games). Previous reviews examined
sex differences in prosocial behaviors such as helping (Eagly,
2009; Eagly & Crowley, 1986) and heroism (S. W. Becker &
Eagly, 2004), whereas other reviews have considered sex differ-
ences in competitive behaviors such as aggression (Archer, 2004,
2009; Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1986) and
negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998).
Yet, these results do not necessarily generalize to mixed-motive
settings such as social dilemmas, which are psychologically unique
because there is a tension between personal and collective interests
in deciding whether people want to cooperate. Furthermore, the
social dilemma paradigm has a high internal validity and is appli-
cable to many real-world problems, which adds to the credibility of
the results.
Our meta-analytic review of 50 years of experimental research
on social dilemmas including 272 effect sizes and 31,462 partic-
ipants revealed a number of interesting results. First, we found no
overall difference between the sexes in cooperation in social
dilemmas (d  –0.05). This result confirms previous narrative
reviews of the literature (e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Ledyard,
1995; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Walters et al., 1998; Weber et al.,
2004), and we can now conclude that this is a robust finding. This
result is aligned with Hyde’s (2005) perspective that men and
women are equal on most psychological phenomena. Importantly,
however, Hyde acknowledged that gender differences can vary
according to features of the situation. Examining context-specific
sex differences in cooperation, we find that men are more coop-
erative in same-sex interactions (d  0.16), whereas women are
more cooperative in mixed-sex interactions (d  –0.22). Also, as
the game continues for several rounds, men become increasingly
more cooperative than women. Finally, sex differences in cooper-
ation are largely unaffected by group size, year of publication, or
the type of dilemma. Below, we discuss these findings in the
context of both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on sex
differences in social behavior.
Are Women or Men More Cooperative?
The sociocultural perspective suggests that women are social-
ized more into communal roles and men into agentic roles. This
produces sex differences in communal and agentic oriented behav-
iors (Wood & Eagly, 2010), which can be explained by the
proximate mechanisms of gender stereotypes that reflect these
orientations (Eagly & Steffen, 1984) as well as men and women
regulating their behaviors according to standards consistent with
these orientations (Wit & Wood, 2010). As we argued earlier, a
relatively greater communal orientation and less agentic orienta-
tion of women would predict that women are more cooperative
(and therefore less selfish) than men in social dilemmas. It is
equally important to note, however, that these predicted sex dif-
ferences in cooperation emerge in particular when these gender
stereotypes or standards are salient (Deaux & Major, 1987).
Similarly, an evolutionary perspective does not make a strong
claim about a main effect of sex on cooperation. Humans are
thought to have evolved context-dependent decision rules for
determining whether or not they should cooperate. For instance,
whereas it is adaptive for men and women to defect in one-shot
interactions both men and women should be more cooperative in
repeated games with the same partners. Thus, it is unlikely that
sex-differentiated adaptations would have emerged in our evolu-
tionary history that incline either women or men to be generally
more cooperative—that is, indiscriminately across a wide range of
situations.
As it turns out, there were no meaningful overall sex differences
in cooperation in our meta-analytic review. Future research may
look at when gender-based communal and agentic stereotypes
and/or standards are activated in specific social dilemma situations
and whether such gender stereotypes are evolved or learnt through
socialization.
Cooperation in Same-Sex Interactions
The sociocultural perspective suggested that female same-sex
interactions would be more cooperative than male same-sex inter-
actions. This is because boys and girls learn at a very young age
distinct forms of social interactions with same-sex others, and
these forms of interactions share features characteristic of agentic
and communal orientations, respectively (Maccoby, 1990; Mac-
coby & Jacklin, 1987). Although this hypothesis finds support in a
single study (Moskowitz, Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994), our meta-
analytic findings indicate just the opposite: Men are actually more
cooperative than women during same-sex interactions.
This finding is more in tune with an evolutionary perspective.
According to an evolutionary perspective, two selective pressures
in our ancestral environments may have selected for male coop-
eration to overcome social dilemmas: hunting large packaged prey
and warfare/inter-group conflict (e.g., Bowles, 2009; Foley & Lee,
1989; Geary et al., 2003; Manson & Wrangham, 1991; Wrangham,
1999). The argument is that throughout human evolutionary his-
tory, male coalitions have been an effective strategy for men to
acquire reproductively relevant resources (e.g., Gat, 2006; Gui-
laine & Zammit, 2004; Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc & Register, 2003;
Thayer, 2004; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). Both hunting and
warfare are social dilemmas in that they firmly pit individual and
group interests against each other. For instance, each individual is
better off enjoying the spoils of hunting or war without actually
having to do the work or take any risks. Yet, if everyone acts upon
their immediate self-interest, then no food will be provided, and
wars will be lost. To overcome such social dilemmas requires
strategies to cooperate with each other, and the evidence suggests
that this has produced a suite of male coalitional adaptations,
including male bonding and male-to-male cooperation. For exam-
ple, men display increased levels of cooperation during inter-group
competition (Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007; Yuki &
Yakota, 2009), show greater amounts of ingroup favoritism in
same-sex groups (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009), have greater levels
of cooperation in same-sex dyads (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965),
and tend to be more accommodating during interpersonal conflict
(Benenson et al., 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 1996). In contrast,
there were no specific pressures on ancestral women to provide
these highly salient public goods and the physical risks involved in
contributing to hunting and warfare selected against women’s
participation in such tasks. Consistent with this view, the anthro-
pological evidence suggests that both hunting large packaged
resources and warfare are all-male activities in modern day and
ethnographically recent foraging societies—which is the best
available model of the way our ancestors lived—as they still are
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today (Dunbar, 1996; Kruger & Nesse, 2004; Potts & Hayden,
2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996).
As a side issue, several researchers have proposed that the
evolution of male cooperation has likely been facilitated by a
history of male kin co-residency, whereby ingroups consist of
genetically related men, such as brothers and cousins, with unre-
lated women (Dunbar, 1996; Geary et al., 2003; Lovejoy, 2009;
Van Vugt & Ahuja, 2010; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996).6 Because
there was a high degree of genetic relatedness among the men in
these ancestral groups, there were clear genetic benefits associated
with male cooperation (Hamilton, 1964; Pasternak, Ember, &
Ember, 1997). Such an ancestral environment would have made it
easier for men to evolve a male coalitional psychology.
Conversely, because women usually migrated between groups,
they would have been interacting mostly with non-kin women.
These women tended not to be relatives, and many were co-wives.
Indeed, ancestral hunter–gatherer societies were mildly polgy-
nous, as they are today, which means that social dynamics among
women would have been rife with sexual competition (Dupanloup
et al., 2003; Flinn & Low, 1986; Hammer, Mendez, Cox, Woerner,
& Wall, 2008; Josephson, 2002; M. B. Mulder, 1992; Sellen, 1999;
Strassman, 1997). Thus, in an ancestral group environment that
was mildly polygynous with men controlling access to resources
and providing offspring care, women may have evolved disposi-
tions to be less cooperative with other women (Benenson, Marko-
vits, Thompson, & Wrangham, 2011; Geary, 2009). Hence, one
would expect less cooperation among women, and this is what our
meta-analytic findings show.
Cooperation in Mixed-Sex Interactions
The sociocultural perspective suggests that as a result of social
roles, women are actually more kind and cooperative and that
female stereotypes reflect these behavioral dispositions—a stereo-
type relevant to social dilemmas. In fact, women are expected to
cooperate more than men in a social dilemma (e.g., Orbell et al.,
1994), and this belief especially exists among women (Aguiar,
Branas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Jimenez, & Miller, 2009; Greig &
Bohnet, 2009; Lacy, 1978). Because women (and men) are eval-
uated negatively when they engage in counter-stereotypical behav-
iors (Costrich et al., 1975), they may be motivated to conform to
their stereotypes. Furthermore, such gender stereotypical beliefs
are likely to be stronger in interactions with the opposite sex
because such situations activate the gender roles (Deaux & Major,
1987). Accordingly, if men and women possess agentic and com-
munal self-concepts, then this should be especially salient in
mixed-sex interactions (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Skrypnek & Sny-
der, 1982). Thus, a salient stereotype in mixed-sex social dilemmas
may lead to communally oriented women to be more cooperative,
and agentic oriented men to become less cooperative. This is
indeed what we find: Women are more cooperative than men in
mixed-sex interactions.
An evolutionary perspective offers an alternative explanation
for these findings. Although the social dilemma context is not a
mating context per se, one could argue that in mixed-sex interac-
tions, mating motives are nevertheless sometimes salient (Li, Hal-
terman, Cason, Knight, & Maner, 2008). Sexual selection theory
asserts (Buss & Schmidt, 1993) that men and women have evolved
to pay attention to different qualities in potential mates. Whereas
men tend to prefer a mate who is prosocial and kind, women tend
to prefer a high-status mate who is socially dominant because it
conveys the man’s success in resource competitions with other
men (Buss, 1989; Gangestad, Simpson, Cousins, Garver-Apgar, &
Christensen, 2004; Kelly & Dunbar, 2001; Li, Bailey, Kenrick, &
Linsenmeier, 2002; Sadalla, Kenrick, & Vershure, 1987). Thus, if
such mate preferences are salient when men and women interact,
women would be motivated to cooperate more and men less.
Subsequent experimental research could pit the sociocultural
and evolutionary predictions against each other by further exam-
ining situational cues eliciting sex differences in cooperation in
mixed-sex interactions. An evolutionary hypothesis predicts that
when men and women are being primed with mating motives—for
example, imagining going on a date with an attractive opposite sex
partner (Griskevicius et al., 2007)—this should exacerbate sex
differences in cooperation. The sociocultural perspective predicts
no such effect. In contrast, gender role primes—for example,
imagining working in a traditional gender role job—would en-
hance sex differences in cooperation (and this effect might be
larger among people strongly endorsing gender stereotypes).
Cooperation During Repeated Interactions
The sociocultural perspective suggests that because women are
expected to be generally kinder and more concerned about others,
they are more likely to accommodate a partner’s defection. Men,
however, as a result of their agentic roles may be more dominant
and be inclined to retaliate in response to a partner’s defection.
This suggests that over the course of an interaction with the same
partners, women will become more cooperative, whereas men will
become less cooperative (sometimes ending up in a cycle of
mutual defection). The meta-analysis results show the opposite:
Over time, men became more cooperative than women during
repeated social dilemmas.
6 Three lines of evidence suggest men tended to reside throughout life
among close consanguineal kin, whereas women transferred residence
away from kin at sexual maturity or marriage. First, human’s closest living
ancestors, chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas, all practice male philopatry
with moderate female dispersal (e.g., Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000;
Bradley, Doran-Sheehy, Lukas, Boesch, & Vigiliant, 2004; Chapais, 2008;
Goodall, 1986; Nishida et al., 2003; Watts, 1996), and phylogenetic anal-
yses suggest that primate co-residential patterns are conservative over time
(Chapais, 2008; Thierry, Iwaniuk, & Pellis, 2000). Second, behavioral
studies on modern forager populations suggest they disproportionately
practice sex-biased affiliation among male kin, with a tendency for brothers
to co-reside (Hill et al., 2011). Moreover, cross-cultural research, finds that
the majority of current human societies are normatively patrilocal (Mur-
dock & Wilson, 1980). Lastly, some human population genetic studies
show evidence of an evolutionary history of female-biased dispersal pat-
terns (Balaresque, Manni, Dugoujon, Crousau-Roy, & Heyer, 2006; Seiel-
stad, Minch, & Cavalli-Sforza, 1998; Wilson et al., 2001). Recently, the
traditional position in anthropology that foragers practiced male philopatry
(e.g., Ember, 1975; Foley, 1995) has been challenged in both the ethno-
graphic literature (e.g., Marlowe, 2004) and in human population genetics
(e.g., Wilder, Kingan, Mobasher, Pilkington, & Hammer, 2004). However,
an adaptation for relatively stronger male same-sex cooperation may still
exist regardless of sex-biased co-residency and dispersal patterns. For
example, male inter-group competition may have been an enduring social
challenge that could alone place enough selective pressure for the emer-
gence of an adaptation for male intragroup cooperation.
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This finding, however, supports an evolutionary line of reason-
ing. In male groups, cooperation is maintained primarily through
dominance hierarchies (Geary, 2010). Although such hierarchies
tend to involve some degree of interpersonal conflict, they evolved
specifically to facilitate social cohesion (Buss, 2005; de Waal,
2000; Hemelrijk & Gygax, 2004). Thus, although men can fight
with each other, they may be more tolerant of defections because
of the benefits of prolonged male cooperation (Benenson, 2009;
Geary et al., 2003). Indeed, developmental research finds that boys
and adult men are more tolerant of interpersonal conflicts than
girls and adult women (Benenson et al., 2009; Eckel & Grossman,
1996; Vigil, 2007).
There is other evidence too that women adhere to a strict
tit-for-tat strategy in social dilemmas and are less tolerant of
defection, especially when interacting with the same partner over
time. Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, and Magan (2004) found that for
women, more so than men, the amount given to another person in
a dictator game hinged on how much the other person gave them
on a previous trial. Behavioral economics findings suggest that
women are more inclined to reciprocate the other person’s trust or
distrust (Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008; Chaudhuri & Gangad-
haran, 2003; Croson & Buchan, 1999; Schwieren & Sutter, 2008;
Snijders & Keren, 2001) and are more punitive of unfair behavior.
A strict tit-for-tat strategy can result in prolonged periods of
mutual defection (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman &
Marshello, 1975). Thus, if women are inclined to mirror others’
actions, they may, compared to men, show less cooperation over
time with the same partners.
Group Size and Cooperation
The sociocultural perspective suggests that sex differences in
social roles may result in sex differences in the importance of close
relationships and group memberships in defining women’s and
men’s self-concepts, respectively (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997;
Cross & Madson, 1997). An implication of this perspective is that
women may be more cooperative in social dilemmas involving
close interpersonal dyadic interactions, and men may be more
cooperative than women in larger group social dilemmas. From an
evolutionary perspective, it has also been suggested that men may
possess social cognitive adaptations that support relatively greater
amounts of male cooperation in larger groups (Markovits &
Benenson, 2010; Van Vugt, 2009). Although one study has found
that men are more cooperative than women in larger groups
(Gabriel & Gardner, 1999), this study asked participants about
their intentions to cooperate. Our review, which is based on actual
behavior, does not support this hypothesis: After controlling for
several study characteristics, group size did not affect sex differ-
ences in cooperation.
Year of Publication
According to the sociocultural perspective, if women assume
more agentic roles or gain greater status, then this should subse-
quently change gender roles (Diekman & Eagly, 2008; Eagly &
Wood, 2011; Wood & Eagly, 2010). In fact, there is evidence that
women have become more agentic over time but still remain more
communally oriented than men (Twenge, 1997, 2001). Although
our initial analysis of year of publication suggested that women
became relatively more cooperative than men in more recent years,
after controlling for several study characteristics that were corre-
lated with the year of publication, the effect of year of publication
disappeared. These findings suggest that societal changes and their
corresponding effects on social roles and gender stereotypes do not
seem to have impacted sex differences in cooperation—at least in
the laboratory studies examined in this meta-analysis. An evolu-
tionary perspective, on the other hand, forwards the position that
some sex differences in social behavior are the result of sex-
specific adaptations that should be persistent over time in the
population. However, adaptations tend to be sensitive to changes
in social environments including, for example, reduced gender
inequality or changes in sex ratios. Although research has sug-
gested that sex-specific cooperative propensities are modulated by
unique socio-ecologies (Macfarlan & Quinlan, 2008), there have
been no theoretical developments about how specific features of a
culture (e.g., marriage or residential rules) systematically affect
sex-typical adaptations for cooperation. Also, we do not know how
such sex-typical adaptations may interact with changes in recent
culture over the past 50 years. In this regard, an integrative
approach that seeks to understand how adaptations and culture
mutually constrain and influence each other may be useful (Ken-
rick, Li, & Butner, 2003).
Summary of Findings
Although we found that women and men were similarly coop-
erative in general, the evolutionary and sociocultural perspectives
put forward separate hypotheses about and explanations for
context-specific sex differences in cooperation. Consistent with a
sociocultural perspective, women were more cooperative in
mixed-sex social dilemmas. Stereotypes of men and women are
more likely to be activated in mixed-sex interactions. To match
these stereotypes, women may become more cooperative and men
less cooperative. Alternatively, an evolutionary perspective sug-
gests that men may desire to signal social dominance to potential
mates, leading to less cooperation by men than women. Also
consistent with an evolutionary approach, which assumes that men
have evolved specialized mechanisms for same-sex cooperation
and greater tolerance for another’s defection, men were more
cooperative in same-sex groups, including dyads, and men became
more cooperative over several iterations of the dilemma. These
findings were contrary to a sociocultural perspective that predicted
greater female same-sex cooperation and women being relatively
more cooperative in response to another’s defection. Additionally,
the meta-analysis showed no support for either a sociocultural or
evolutionary perspective that suggests men would be more coop-
erative in larger groups. Finally, although sex differences in social
behavior were hypothesized from a sociocultural perspective to
have changed over the last 50 years, our analysis did not indicate
any significant change in sex differences in cooperation during this
time.
Taken together, our meta-analytic review finds some support for
both the evolutionary and sociocultural accounts of sex differences
in cooperation. Indeed, we believe future research on sex differ-
ences in cooperation would be best served by the development of
an integrated evolutionary and sociocultural perspective.
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Theoretical Implications: Integrating Evolutionary and
Cultural Perspectives
Sex differences in cooperation are perhaps better understood as
a function of both evolutionary and cultural processes. Although a
full theoretical integration of these perspectives is beyond the
scope of this article (for previous attempts, see Archer, 1996, 2009;
Kenrick et al., 2003), we briefly address two features of this
integration and their importance for future research on sex differ-
ences.
First, evolved psychological sex differences may constrain the
influence of the current social environment. For example, sex-
typical adaptations may affect both the socialization process of
boys and girls (Low, 1989) and the emergence of sex differentiated
cooperative institutions (Kenrick & Luce, 2000; Kenrick, Trost, &
Sundie, 2004). In this regard, an evolved male coalitional psychol-
ogy explains why across all cultures there is an overrepresentation
of men in business, politics, and warfare (Van Vugt, 2009; Wood
& Eagly, 2002; Whyte, 1978) and why men are more cooperative
especially under conditions of intergroup threat (Bugental & Beau-
lieu, 2009; Van Vugt et al., 2007; Yuki & Yokota, 2009) and in
repeated interactions with the same partners (Benenson et al.,
2011; Geary et al., 2003). In the absence of such ancestrally
relevant cues, sex differences in cooperation are less likely to
appear. Future research may extend this analysis by examining
how cultural influences can exacerbate or diminish the influence of
sex-typical adaptations for cooperation.
Second, values and behavior are influenced by cultural factors.
Through cultural transmission processes, humans learn what is
socially appropriate (D’Andrade, 1989), including stereotypical
beliefs associated with sex roles. Two important cultural variables
that may affect sex differences in cooperation are the family
context (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Flinn & Ward, 2005)
and institutional structures (e.g., marriage and residence rules;
Low, 1989). These cultural factors systematically affect socializa-
tion processes that may in turn reinforce or diminish the manifes-
tation of sex differences in cooperation. Low’s (1989) cross-
cultural research shows that parents in patrilocal societies (a
marriage rule specifying men and their brides reside among kins-
men after marriage, as such power is shared among male kin) teach
boys to cooperate with each other and to obey authority figures,
which facilitates the emergence of male cooperative groups headed
by older men. In cultures in which male–male coalitions have less
functional importance and male–female coalitions are more im-
portant (feminine cultures; Hofstede, 2001), socialization pro-
cesses are likely to be less sex differentiated.
In general, the cultural environment likely provides important
informational inputs for the evolution and the processing of adap-
tive decision rules, which operate at the individual level (Cos-
mides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992; N. Henrich & Henrich, 2007;
Kenrick et al., 2003). In turn, individuals interacting with one
another, each with their evolved decision rules for adaptively
processing information, dynamically comprise culture. Thus, cul-
tural and evolutionary processes are likely intertwined, and an
integrative approach, which seeks to understand how adaptations
and culture mutually constrain and influence each other, may be
most useful in understanding complex social phenomena such as
sex differences in cooperation.
Social Dilemmas as a Paradigm to Examine Sex
Differences in Cooperation
Social dilemma studies provide an exceptional context to study
sex differences in cooperation, because these experiments are
highly controlled situations that directly pit self against collective
interests. Because these conflicts of interests are pervasive in our
day-to-day social lives (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008), our find-
ings generalize to a myriad of contexts involving dyads and
groups. Furthermore, the diversity of studies in our sample enabled
us to zoom in on key situational features affecting sex differences
in cooperation. For instance, each study either allowed same-sex or
mixed-sex interactions, had a predetermined number of group
members, and had a predetermined number of iterations. However,
the studies were limited in that they did not compare interactions
between ingroup versus outgroup members, friends versus strang-
ers, and kin versus non-kin. Future research on sex differences in
cooperation will benefit by constructing experimental social di-
lemma contexts that manipulate these and other features of the
situation that are hypothesized—based on an integrated evolution-
ary and cultural theory—to affect sex differences in cooperation
(Van Vugt et al., 2007).
Do social dilemmas enable us to test for sex differences in
competition and aggression? Theoretically, the social dilemma
is not a test of cooperation versus competition (aggression) but
of cooperation versus defection (i.e., not cooperating). There
are many reasons why people may defect in social dilemmas,
and only one of them is having a competitive motivation—
normally only about 5% of participants have a competitive
orientation (Au & Kwong, 2004; Komorita & Parks, 1994).
Moreover, prior research suggests that people defect in social
dilemmas—at least in the laboratory contexts we include in our
meta-analysis— because of a concern for self-interest, not com-
petition (Komorita & Parks, 1994). Hypotheses about sex dif-
ferences in competition (or aggression) should be tested in
competitive economic games, such as zero-sum or maximizing
difference games.
Our meta-analytic findings extend previous work on social
dilemmas in important ways. Walters et al. (1998) conducted a
quantitative review of sex differences in two-person social dilem-
mas and also failed to find an overall main effect of sex. Our
analysis goes further in several ways. First, whereas Walters et al.
only examined behavior in prisoner’s dilemma games, we exam-
ined behavior in all types of social dilemmas. In doing so, we
found that men’s and women’s behavior in dilemmas are affected
not only by the sex of the interaction partners but also the number
of iterations of the dilemma. Second, whereas Walters et al. only
considered dyadic interactions, we examined behavior in both
dyads and larger groups. Third, their sample included many null
findings that were estimated as zero effect sizes relative to actual
coded effect sizes. This is problematic because several of these
estimated null findings likely observed a mean difference between
men and women but lacked the statistical power to detect a small
effect size. In summary, our research overcomes some of the
limitations of previous research by examining sex differences in
cooperation in a much wider range of dilemmas with a much larger
sample of studies (k  51 vs. k  272).
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Practical Implications
Our meta-analytic findings are relevant to several disciplines in
psychology. For example, research in developmental psychology
may benefit from at least two aspects of the current research. First,
past research on children’s cooperation has often used paradigms
that align self-interest with cooperation (for review, see Knight &
Chao, 1989). However, the present findings suggest that by pitting
self-interest against cooperative motives, developmental research-
ers can more directly examine when children value the welfare of
others over personal welfare. Second, developmental researchers
may benefit from a careful consideration of how age interacts with
sex to predict cooperation in social dilemmas. Along these lines,
one study found that boys’ same-sex interactions become more
cooperative between 7 and 11 years of age, whereas 7–11-year-old
girls’ same-sex interactions become less cooperative (Sampson &
Kardush, 1965). Fehr et al. (2008) found that boys (3–8 years of
age) are more tolerant than girls of receiving a lower share of
outcomes than a fellow ingroup member, compared to when they
were interacting with an outgroup member. Such findings suggest
that a male bias toward cooperating with male ingroup members
develops relatively early. However, the results of the present
analysis suggest that these studies may benefit from manipulating
the gender composition of dyads/groups and examining cultural
influences that may exacerbate or inhibit sex differences such as
different socialization practices and different societal threats (war-
fare).
Cross-cultural psychology may benefit from a consideration of
how social roles correspond to structural aspects of the society,
including family structure and the workplace. Such roles may
moderate both male and female dispositions toward cooperation.
Andersen, Bulte, Gneezy, and List (2008) recently found that men
in a matrilineal society are more cooperative during mixed-sex
interactions than men in a patriarchal society. Future research
could expand on this work by controlling for additional cross-
cultural differences (e.g., cultural values) while measuring poten-
tial mediating mechanisms (e.g., social roles and male vs. female
stereotypes) of the effect of cultural differences on sex differences
in cooperation. More generally, there is a need to methodologically
isolate cultural variables to determine which aspects of culture are
affecting the sex–cooperation association and to study the psycho-
logical processes that mediate the culture–cooperation relation-
ship.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
The conclusions of our meta-analysis are limited to the types of
social dilemmas included in our sample. Specifically, the studies
included in our analysis were social dilemmas in which the inter-
ests and outcomes of the players were symmetrical and there was
full information on others’ outcomes. Thus, the results of our
meta-analysis may not necessarily generalize to situations where
cooperation occurs in the context of asymmetrical dependency
(e.g., one partner has relatively more power) or information un-
certainty (e.g., not knowing a partner’s outcomes). Kelley et al.
(2003) noted that changes in the structure of a situation (e.g.,
greater asymmetrical dependence) will affect the expression of
particular traits and motives such as social dominance, which in
turn may influence the manifestation of sex differences in coop-
eration.
A common misperception about social dilemmas research is that
it lacks external validity. Yet, behavior in social dilemma experi-
ments predicts cooperation outside the laboratory very well. For
instance, the number of cooperative choices in dilemma games
predicts how much people donate to charitable causes (Van Lange,
Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt, 2007), and students quite accurately
predict how their roommate would behave in such paradigms
(Bem & Lord, 1979).
Another potential limitation of our work is that the effect sizes
in our studies are relatively small. However, small effect sizes are
common in meta-analytic reviews of sex differences and social
psychological research in general (Eagly & Wood, 1991; Hyde,
2005) and can still be considered important due to an accumulative
impact over time (Abelson, 1985; Martell, Lane, & Emrich, 1996).
Thus, we believe that the small effect sizes do not undermine the
importance of our findings. Finally, although our sample included
studies conducted in 18 countries, our search was limited to
English written articles, and most studies were conducted in the
United States. This is a concern because most studies in our sample
come from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Demo-
cratic (WEIRD) countries, and studies conducted in WEIRD coun-
tries can generate different results than those conducted elsewhere
(J. Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Our understanding of
the evolutionary and cultural basis of sex differences in coopera-
tion will benefit from including participants from non-Western
cultures.
Concluding Remarks
Since Maccoby and Jacklin’s (1974) review concluded that sex
differences in social behavior were small and negligible, a research
tradition developed to review sex differences in specific domains
such as aggression, helping, and leadership, applying meta-
analytic techniques. Our quantitative review extends this literature
by examining sex differences in social dilemmas. We started by
asking the question: Are women or men more cooperative? Our
answer: It depends. Women are not more cooperative than men, in
general. However, several factors moderate the sex–cooperation
relationship, including the sex of partner and the duration of the
interaction. Several findings support an evolutionary perspective
on sex differences in cooperation, but there is also some support
for a sociocultural perspective. Future research will benefit from
an integration of evolutionary and sociocultural approaches to
develop a more sophisticated theory of sex differences in social
behavior. Doing so will refine our questions and direct future
research efforts, resulting in a more comprehensive understanding
of the effect of sex on cooperation.
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